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     NO. 45046 
 
Ada County Case No. CR01-16-39808 
 
           
     RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Jesus Salvador Ramos Cornejo (hereinafter “Ramos”) failed to show that the district 
court abused its sentencing discretion when it sentenced him to eight years with four years 





Ramos Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 The victim, L.T., reported that Ramos offered her a ride to work, which she accepted.  
(PSI, p. 4.1)  Ramos gave her an unknown drug, took her to a shed, and there sexually assaulted 
her.  (PSI, p. 4.)  During the course of the assault Ramos choked L.T. with his hands and with her 
employment lanyard.  (PSI, pp. 4-5.)   
   The state charged Ramos with rape and delivery of a controlled substance.  (R., pp. 30-
31.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement the state reduced the rape charge to aggravated battery and 
dismissed the delivery charge and Ramos pled guilty to the amended charge.  (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 15-
22; p. 10, L. 18 – p. 11, L. 14; p. 15, L. 21 – p. 17, L. 5; R., pp. 50-64.)  The district court 
imposed a sentence of eight years with four years determinate.  (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 14-18; R., pp. 71-
73.)   
 On appeal Ramos argues the district court imposed an excessive sentence because it 
“should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, including probation, in light of the 
mitigating factors, including his family support, work history, and acceptance of responsibility.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)  Application of the law to the district court’s factual findings shows this 
argument to be without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering 
the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) 
                                            
1 Page number citations to the PSI are to the electronic page numbers. 
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(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 
552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). 
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court 
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  
 
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)). 
 
C. Ramos Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining whether the appellant met his burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is 
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be 
the period of actual incarceration.  Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391.  To establish that 
the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the 
sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution.  Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  The “primary 
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objective” of sentencing is “the protection of society.”  State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376 
P.3d 744, 748 (2016). 
 The district court applied the correct legal standards regarding its sentencing discretion.  
(Tr., p. 38, Ls. 9-12.)  It also applied the statutory factors regarding suspending a sentence and 
ordering probation.  (Tr., p. 38, Ls. 13-18 (citing I.C. § 19-2521).)   The district court found an 
undue risk that Ramos would commit another crime during probation; that Ramos had a history 
of criminal offenses; that he was in need of treatment, and that the treatment should happen in 
custody; that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime; that the sentence 
would provide punishment and specific and general deterrence; and that Ramos was a multiple 
offender.  (Tr., p. 38, L. 19 – p. 40, L. 13.)  Because the district court applied the correct legal 
standards and because its factual findings support the sentence imposed, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion.  
 Ramos’s argument that mitigating factors show the district court abused its discretion 
does not withstand analysis.  The first mitigator, family support (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4), was 
specifically considered by the district court (Tr., p. 37, L. 18 – p. 38, L. 8).  The district court 
determined that although the expressions of support were a positive factor, this was offset by 
Ramos’s claim that frustration over family difficulties was a contributing factor to his 
commission of the crime.  (Tr., p. 37, L. 18 – p. 38, L. 8.)  Ramos has not shown that the district 
court “failed to adequately consider his family support when imposing sentence.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 4.) 
 The second factor Ramos claims was mitigating was his employability.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 4-5.)  The 37-year-old Ramos reported that he had been employed in 2014 and 2015 
and for two months in 2016.  (PSI, pp. 2, 13-14.)  He admitted “some problems” in maintaining 
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long-term stable employment in the past.  (PSI, p. 14.)  Although not specifically cited, Ramos’s 
employment history may have been considered in the district court’s factual finding that Ramos 
was not a career criminal.  (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 8-9.)  Ramos has shown no abuse of discretion for 
inadequate consideration of his employability. 
 The final factor cited by Ramos is his expression of remorse.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  
While it is nice that Ramos has expressed remorse, the psychosexual evaluation classified him as 
“a high risk to reoffend within the next five to ten years as compared to other sexual offenders.”  
(PSI, p. 56.)  Ramos has failed to show the district court failed to give his expressions of remorse 
adequate consideration. 
 The district court applied the correct legal standards and its factual findings support its 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 




      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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